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Abstract
This paper provides a critique of the common practice in the health-policy literature of focusing on
hypothetical outcome removal at the expense of intervention analysis. The paper begins with an
introduction to measures of causal effects within the potential-outcomes framework, focusing on
underlying conceptual models, definitions and drawbacks of special relevance to policy formulation
based on epidemiologic data. It is argued that, for policy purposes, one should analyze intervention
effects within a multivariate-outcome framework to capture the impact of major sources of
morbidity and mortality. This framework can clarify what is captured and missed by summary
measures of population health, and shows that the concept of summary measure can and should
be extended to multidimensional indices.
Introduction
This paper describes a set of fundamental concepts from
causality theory that can be used to critically analyze sum-
mary measures of population health. It then uses these
concepts to argue that health measures based on hypo-
thetical outcome removal [1,2] are ambiguous and poten-
tially misleading. Thorough analyses require a
multivariate framework to capture what is known about
sources of morbidity and mortality. Because of the una-
voidable shortcomings of single-valued summaries, mul-
tidimensional indices should be considered for summary
measures of population health.
The first task is to define cause and effect in a manner pre-
cise enough for logical manipulation and quantification.
Three types of models have achieved widespread usage:
• Counterfactual or potential-outcome models. The counter-
factual conceptualization of causality was glimpsed by
Hume [3] and was operationalized by statisticians in the
1920s and 1930s in the form of potential-outcome mod-
els [4]. Related counterfactual models have also received
much attention in philosophy [5,6], and potential out-
come models are now common in social sciences [7,8]
and epidemiology (see citations below) as well as in sta-
tistics.
• Structural-equations models. These models can be traced
to early work in path analysis in the 1920s and were given
full expression by econometricians in the 1940s.
• Graphical models (causal diagrams). These models also
originated in path analysis, but were not fully developed
until the early 1990s [9-11].
In his book on causal theory, Pearl [11] details the above
approaches and their histories, emphasizing that they are
logically equivalent (isomorphic) for all practical pur-
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poses. This means that an analysis using one approach can
be translated into either of the other two approaches,
while maintaining logical consistency. Greenland and
Poole [12] and Greenland and Brumback [13] describe
the connections between potential outcome models and
the sufficient-component cause models familiar to epide-
miologists, and Greenland [14] discusses potential out-
come models in relation to more traditional approaches
to causal inference.
Because of the emphasis on counterfactual models in the
literature on measures of cause and effect, the following
development is based on them. Further details of counter-
factual theory for health science research are described
elsewhere [12,14-26]. For details on its relation to miss-
ing-data models, see Rubin [27]. The present paper con-
cerns only issues of defining effects and their implications
for policy formulation. Equally important is quantitative
accounting for study biases in estimating effects; see
Greenland [28,29], Lash and Fink [30], and Phillips [31]
for recent developments in that topic.
Basic concepts of counterfactual causality
Actions, outcomes and counterfactuals
To minimize ambiguity, a counterfactual model requires
reasonably precise definitions of the following model
ingredients:
• At least one target subject of interest in whom or which
causation is to be studied (e.g. a specific person or popu-
lation).
• A list of two or more possible alternative actions, x0, x1,
etc., that could have been applied at or over a span of
time, one of which may be the actual action taken.
• An outcome measure, Y, taken at a point in time or over
a period of time, following completion of the action.
As an example, the subject could be Kosovo, the action
x1could be revocation of its autonomy by Yugoslavia in
1988, an alternative x0 could be that revocation never
occurred, and the outcome measure could be the mortal-
ity rate of pre-1999 residents during 1999. Because only
one of the possible actions x0, x1, etc. can take place, all
but one of the actions must become counterfactual, or con-
trary to fact. In the example, the actual (or factual) action
was x1 = "revocation of autonomy"; thus, the action x0 =
"no revocation" is counterfactual. (This example also
illustrates the truism that to do nothing is an action, cor-
responding to zero on an action scale.)
If xa is the actual action taken (from the list x0, x1, etc.), we
may observe the outcome Y(xa) that follows that action. A
counterfactual outcome model posits that, for any counter-
factual action, xc (from the same list), there is also a well-
defined outcome, Y(xc), that would have followed that
action. The entire list of such outcomes Y(x0), Y(x1), Y(x2),
... is called the set of potential outcomes of the subject; it
includes both the actual outcome Y(xa) as well as all the
outcomes of counterfactual actions.
In the example, the actual action, xa, was x1 and was even-
tually followed by a mortality rate, Y(x1), in 1999. Y(x1) is
difficult to assess but nonetheless exists as a matter of fact;
it is part of what occurred subsequently to the action x1. A
counterfactual model for 1999 mortality posits that, had
the counterfactual action x0 been taken instead (that is, if
no revocation had occurred), the mortality would have
equaled some number, Y(x0). Given that x0 is counterfac-
tual, it is logically impossible for us to observe Y(x0).
Nonetheless, the counterfactual model treats this number
as a precise, though unknown, quantity.
The idea of treating the outcome, Y(xc), under a counter-
factual action, xc, as a precise quantity has been a source of
much controversy and misunderstanding (e.g.
[23,32,33]). Some major misunderstandings are
addressed below:
1) The counterfactual approach does not require that the
outcome,  Y(xc), be precisely defined for every possible
counterfactual action, xc. In the above example, if we are
interested only in contrasting revocation (x1) with no
action (x0), our model need not mention any other
actions. That is, we can limit the action list to just those
actions of interest.
2) The counterfactual approach is not inherently deter-
ministic in either the classical or quantum-mechanical
sense [15,34]. The potential outcomes, Y(x0), Y(x1), etc.,
may represent different values for a statistical parameter in
a classical probability model. For example, they may be
expected rates in Poisson models. Alternatively, they may
represent different mixtures of superposed states (differ-
ent wave functions) in quantum models. Indeed, some
theoreticians regard counterfactuals as essential for for-
mulating coherent explanations of quantum phenomena
[35].
3) The counterfactual approach extends the partial quan-
tification of outcomes, Y(xc), under counterfactual actions
embedded in ordinary discourse. In the example, some
(though not all) observers of the events in Kosovo 1988–
1999 speculated that the actual 1999 mortality, Y(x1), was
probably greater than Y(x0), the mortality that would have
occurred had autonomy never been revoked. This specu-
lation arises from the following tentative explanation of
actual events in Kosovo: revocation of autonomy, (x1),
caused Albanian resistance to increased Serb authority,Emerging Themes in Epidemiology 2005, 2:5 http://www.ete-online.com/content/2/1/5
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which in turn caused Serbian leaders to extend their "eth-
nic cleansing" policy to Kosovo. Had there been no revo-
cation, (x0), this tragic causal sequence of events would
not have occurred.
Cause and effect
The speculative explanation in the third bulleted item
above is an example of an informal causal hypothesis.
Consideration of such hypotheses has led to the following
definition: An effect of taking an action, xj, rather than
another action, xk, on an outcome measure, Y, is a numer-
ical contrast of that measure (e.g. the difference or ratio)
under the two different actions. The contrast is called an
effect measure. In the example, the contrast Y(x1) - Y(x0) is
an effect of revocation x1 versus no revocation x0; this
effect measure is known as the mortality difference due to
x1 versus x0. Similarly, Y(x1) / Y(x0) is the effect measure
known as the mortality ratio due to x1 versus x0.
Many common ideas and a few surprises follow from the
above definitions, among them:
4) An effect is a relation between the outcomes that would
follow two different actions, xj and xk, in just one subject (a
population or single person). It is thus meaningless to talk
of (say) "the effect of smoking a pack a day"; one must at
least imply a reference (baseline) action for "the effect" to
have meaning. While smoking a pack a day can cause lung
cancer relative to no smoking, it can also prevent lung can-
cer relative to smoking two packs a day.
5) If Y(xj) = Y(xk), we say that having xj happen rather than
xk had no effect on Y for the subject; otherwise, we say that
having xj happen rather than xk caused the outcome to be
Y(xj) and prevented the outcome from being Y(xk). For
example, we may say that smoking prevents survival past
age 70 years just as surely as it causes death by age 70. Sim-
ilarly, we may say that not smoking causes survival past
age 70 just as surely as it prevents death by age 70. Thus,
the distinction between causation and prevention is
merely a matter of whether we are talking of an action, xj,
and  its  consequence,  Y(xj) (causation of Y(xj)), or an
action,  xj, and a consequence, Y(xk), of an alternative
action xk ≠  xj(prevention of Y(xk)).
6) At least one of the actions, xj, xk, in an effect measure
must be counterfactual. Thus, we can never observe an
effect measure separate from an outcome measure. In the
example, we observed the mortality Y(x1) = Y(x0) + [Y(x1)
- Y(x0)], so the mortality difference, Y(x1) - Y(x0), is mixed
with the reference (baseline) mortality rate, Y(x0), in our
observation. The best we can do is make an informed esti-
mate of Y(x0), which is the outcome that would have hap-
pened under the counterfactual action x0, and from that
estimate deduce an estimate of the effect measure (by sub-
traction, in this example).
Causation, confounding and association
Problem 6 is considered a fundamental problem of all
causal inference. It was recognized by Hume [36] and is
now known as the identification problem of cause and
effect. All causal inferences (and hence all intervention
plans) depend on accuracy in estimating or predicting at
least one unobserved potential outcome following one
counterfactual action. We ordinarily make this prediction
based on observations of other subjects (controls) who
experienced actual actions different from the subject of
interest. For example, we might estimate that the mortal-
ity Kosovo would have experienced in 1999 had there
been no revocation, Y(x0), would equal the mortality it
experienced in 1988, before violence began growing. In
making this estimate, we run the risk of error because, even
under the action x0  (no revocation), Kosovo mortality
might have changed between 1988 and 1999. If so, we say
that our estimate is confounded by this unknown change.
Denote by Y1988 the mortality experienced by Kosovo in
1988. We can then restate the last problem as follows: we
do not observe Y(x0), so we cannot directly compute a
measure of the effect of x1 versus  x0. If, however, we
believed the speculative explanation given in the above
third bulleted item, we might also think that Y1988 is not
too far from Y(x0), and so substitute Y1988 for Y(x0) in our
measures. Thus, if we also observe Y(x1), the actual 1999
mortality, we would estimate the effect measure Y(x1) -
Y(x0) with the observed mortality difference Y(x1) - Y1988.
The latter observed difference is called a measure of associ-
ation, because it contrasts two different subjects (Kosovo in
1999 versus Kosovo in 1988), rather than one subject
under two different actions in our list (Kosovo in 1999
under revocation versus Kosovo in 1999 with no revoca-
tion). Because of the identification problem (we cannot
see Y(x0)), we must substitute a measure of association for
the measure of effect. In this usage, the observed differ-
ence will misrepresent the effect measure by an amount
equal to the difference of the two:
[Y(x1) - Y1988] - [Y(x1) - Y(x0)] = Y(x0) - Y1988
This quantity measures the amount of confounding in the
association measure (the observed difference) when it is
used as a substitute for the effect measure. Like the effect
measure itself, the confounding measure contains the
unobserved  Y(x0) and so can only be estimated, not
observed directly. Suppose, however, that we know of rea-
sons why Y(x0) and Y1988 would differ, such as changes in
age structure over time. We can then attempt to adjust
Y1988 for these suspected differences, in the hopes of get-Emerging Themes in Epidemiology 2005, 2:5 http://www.ete-online.com/content/2/1/5
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ting closer to Y(x0). Standardization is probably simplest
example of such adjustment [18,26].
The presumption underlying use of an adjusted effect
measure is that it accounts for all important differences
between the unobserved (counterfactual) reference out-
come, Y(x0), and the substitute, Y1988, in the above exam-
ple. The presumption is debatable in most applications;
for example, some would argue that "ethnic cleansing"
would have spread to Kosovo even without autonomy
revocation and Albanian resistance. This problem of
uncontrolled confounding is but one of many methodo-
logical problems in estimating effects that are discussed in
textbooks (e.g. [26]).
The effects of outcome removal
Consider a question that asks about the health burden
attributable to y1 versus y0, where y1and y0are not actions
in the earlier sense, but are themselves alternative outcomes
such as AIDS death and CHD death. For example, y1 could
be "subject dies of lung cancer" and y0could be "subject
does not die of lung cancer". As in the earlier framework,
these outcomes are mutually exclusive possibilities for
just one subject at any one time; hence, at least one must
become counterfactual. Because they are not interven-
tions, however, there is severe ambiguity in any definition
of another outcome, T, as a function of the potential out-
comes, y1 and y0, because T depends in a critical fashion
on how y1 and y0 are caused.
To see this, suppose T is years of life lived beyond age 50
(which is age at death minus 50). How would one have
brought about y0 (prevented the lung-cancer death) if the
subject were a male lifelong heavy smoker who developed
lung cancer at age 51 and died from it at age 54 (and so
had T(y1) = 4 years of life after age 50)? If y0 had been
achieved by convincing the subject to never start smoking,
T(y0) could be much larger than T(y1), because the risks of
many other causes of death (e.g. CHD) would have been
much lower as a consequence of never smoking. But if y0
had been achieved via an unusually successful new chem-
otherapy for lung tumors, T(y0) might be little changed
from T(y1). This would occur if, shortly after remission,
the subject had a fatal myocardial infarction whose occur-
rence was traceable to smoking-induced coronary steno-
sis.
The problem just described has long been recognized in
discussions of estimating the impact of "cause removal"
or "removal of competing risks" when the "causes" or
"risks" at issue are outcomes rather than actions or treat-
ments [37]. These outcomes are not subject to direct
manipulation independent of the earlier history of the
subject. Therefore, any realistic evaluation of the impact
of their removal must account for other effects of the
means of removal.
A similar problem arises in the evaluation of ordinary
treatments whenever noncompliance can occur. In gen-
eral, only advice or prescriptions are under control of the
health practitioner; what a patient actually receives is
affected not only by advice or prescription, but also by the
many complex social and personality factors that influ-
ence compliance. This leads to manifold problems in eval-
uating the effects of received treatment [38], for then the
treatment a subject receives is only an outcome, Y(xj), of
an earlier prescriptive action, xj. In most cases, however,
this initial action is unambiguous.
Suppose we could avoid the ambiguity problem by intro-
ducing a pair of well-defined alternative actions, x1 and x0
such that x1 causes y1 and prevents y0relative to x0. That is,
suppose y1 will follow x1, whereas y0 will follow x0, so that
we have y1 = Y(x1) and y0 = Y(x0) with y1 ≠  y0. We may still
face a serious confounding problem in the form of
"dependent competing risks". Consider again the heavy
smoker who develops lung cancer at age 54, with treat-
ment, x0, being successful chemotherapy. It could be a
mistake to calculate this subject's life expectancy, T(x0),
from that of other heavy smokers of the same age and sex
who had not developed lung cancer, because such smok-
ers may differ in ways that render them not only less sus-
ceptible to smoking-induced lung cancer, but also less
susceptible to other smoking-induced cancers (perhaps
because they have better DNA-repair mechanisms).
More generally, even if the means of removal is precisely
defined, feasible and has no side effects, there is rarely a
basis to believe, and often good reason to doubt, that
removal of a particular outcome (such as a particular
cause of death) would be followed by risks similar to risks
among persons who, in the absence of intervention, do
not experience the removed outcome [37,39]. Unfortu-
nately, standard statistical procedures for projecting out-
comes under cause removal (such as Kaplan-Meier/
product limit methods and traditional "cause-deleted" life
tables) are based on this similarity assumption.
In view of the problems just described, it is reasonable to
conclude the following:
7) Projections of the impact of outcome removal (e.g.
removal of a particular ICD9 cause of death [1]), rather
than an action that brings about outcome reduction, may
not be useful for program planning. Except perhaps in
some unusually simple cases (e.g. smallpox eradication),
the effects of actions and policies do not correspond to
simple cause removal.Emerging Themes in Epidemiology 2005, 2:5 http://www.ete-online.com/content/2/1/5
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8) Even when we have a treatment that specifically and
completely prevents an outcome, biased effect estimates
are likely if one simply projects the experience of those
who naturally lack the outcome onto those who avoid the
outcome because of the treatment. Only ongoing follow-
up of successfully treated subjects can reliably identify the
impact of outcome removal.
Problem 7 implies that summary measures for policy for-
mulation should refer to effects of operationalizable
actions (e.g. anti-smoking campaigns, food-distribution
programs), rather than effects of removing the outcomes
targeted by those actions (e.g. smoking, cancer, malnutri-
tion). Only rarely will the two effects coincide. Focusing
on the outcome removal presents a grossly overoptimistic
picture of what can actually be accomplished, since the
latter is determined by what feasible interventions are
available. Focusing on outcome removal has the potential
of diverting resources away from where it will do the most
good – outcomes with feasible and effective preventives –
toward outcomes that, while more common and costly,
have less hope of successful and economical prevention.
Finally, a focus on outcome removal diverts attention
from assessing and comparing the full impacts of inter-
ventions. For example, even partial reduction in tobacco
use will result in a broad spectrum of outcome preven-
tion, from heart disease to lung cancer, whereas an effec-
tive treatment for lung cancer would only reduce the
burden from that disease while raising the burden from
tobacco-related risks.
The preceding consideration raises another point: Because
any action will have multiple consequences, a thorough
analysis must consider outcomes in a multivariate frame-
work that accounts for the multiple effects of actions and
the competition among various outcomes. This multivar-
iate perspective raises serious questions about the value of
univariate summaries, which will be taken up after the
next section.
Are socioeconomic indicators causes?
The theory outlined above is strictly a theory of effects of
actions or interventions. It does not formalize all ordinary-
language or intuitive uses of the words "cause" and
"effect". Two naïve extreme reactions to this limitation
have been common: one that denies it is meaningful to
talk of causes that are not actions and so restricts "causes"
to interventions [33], and one that rejects counterfactual
theory outright (see the discussion of Maldonado and
Greenland [23]). But two types of constructive reactions
have also appeared. The first type generalizes the theory to
encompass nonactions as causes, a prime example being
the many-worlds theory [5]. While this generalization
may best capture ordinary language, it is very controver-
sial and not suitably operationalized for everyday use.
The second constructive response accepts the limitations
of the restricted theory and instead seeks to identify
potential actions within ordinary events. This approach
recognizes that certain "causes" are best treated as inter-
mediate outcomes; one then traces the etiology of such
"causes" back to events with intervention potential, or else
treats such "causes" as conditioning events and searches
for actions that modify or prevent the ultimate outcomes.
Earthquakes, which cause extensive destruction, provide
neutral examples of unmodifiable causes. An earthquake,
y1, is the outcome of a long and complex chain of events
with little intervention potential under today's technol-
ogy. Perhaps someday we will be capable of interventions
that lead to dissipation of crustal stresses with less ensuing
damage. But for now, mere prediction would be a major
achievement and would facilitate actions to prevent dam-
age when an earthquake occurs. An example of such an
action is the enforcement of strict building codes in earth-
quake-prone regions.
Less neutral examples are provided by common measures
of education, such as the classification "No high-school
diploma", "High-school diploma", "Some college, no
degree", "Two-year degree", "Four-year degree" and
"Graduate degree". People believe that education leads to
more income and health. But how well do differences in
the observed education measure predict the effects of real
interventions such as affirmative action, public-school
improvements, or scholarship programs? For policy pur-
poses, it is the implementation and evaluation of such
programs that matter; the ensuing changes in education
measures are only intermediates between the programs
and the ultimate goals of improved social, economic and
health outcomes.
The value of restricting counterfactual models to interven-
tions is that it forces us to explain observed associations
between risk factors and health as outcomes of potentially
changeable events. Consider a highly charged example,
"race", which when measured as "white" vs. "black" is
strongly associated with many health events. People talk
of race as a "cause". But to do something about racial dis-
parities in health outcomes (which is to say, to eliminate
the observed association of race and health), we must
explain their origin in terms of changeable causes, such as
disparities in school funding, availability of individual
college funding, prevalence of racist attitudes, etc. Finding
feasible interventions and estimating their costs and ben-
efits is required to address observed disparities; asserting
or denying that "race" is a cause does not help this
endeavor.Emerging Themes in Epidemiology 2005, 2:5 http://www.ete-online.com/content/2/1/5
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Should different outcomes be summarized in a 
single number?
Two distinct connotations of summary measure appear
extant: the first and most common presumes that the
measure summarizes a single outcome variable with a sin-
gle number. Classic examples include the mortality rate
and the life expectancy. The second connotation, largely
confined to statistics and physical sciences, allows a sum-
mary to be a vector, that is, an ordered list of numbers that
summarize different dimensions of a system. An example
of such a multidimensional or multivariate population sum-
mary would be the list containing life expectancy, health
expectancy, health gap and the proportions of deaths due
to various causes (e.g. starvation, violence, infectious dis-
ease, heart disease, stroke, cancer).
It should first be noted that all the earlier concepts and
discussion apply equally to any action or outcome,
whether unidimensional or multidimensional. In particu-
lar, the potential outcomes, Y(xj), may represent outcome
vectors and the alternative actions, x0, x1, etc., may also be
vectors; for example, x0 could specify that 30%, 40% and
30% of a fixed budget be allocated to family planning,
sanitation and medical supplies, respectively, and x1 spec-
ifies a different allocation scheme. The chief problem in
expanding to the multidimensional perspective is the lim-
ited number of dimensions that the human mind can
contemplate at once. Because that limitation is a key
motive for summarization, it is essential to keep track of
what is lost in the dimensionality reduction that defines
summarization. It also is essential to keep track of the val-
ues that influence (or should influence) what is kept and
what is lost.
Summary measures of population health serve no good
purpose when they strongly confound valuations, which
vary by individual preference, culture, etc., with measures
of occurrence and effect (which are presumably matters of
scientific fact, albeit subject to uncertainty). For example,
many individuals, in continuing to smoke, explain their
behavior as stemming from a conscious preference to die
sooner from cardiovascular disease or cancer than survive
until mental or neurological deficit is nearly inevitable.
For such individuals, measures such as healthy years of
life lost due to smoking represent a conflation of someone
else's values with the factual risks of smoking, because
that summary ignores preferences among various morbid-
ity and mortality outcomes affected by smoking. To give
the individual the information necessary for personal
choice, we must supply a multidimensional summary that
includes lifetime risks of different diseases.
Moving to the societal level, healthy years of life lost due
to smoking not only neglects the differences in resource
allocation that must exist between present (actual) society
and a counterfactual tobacco-free society, it also neglects
differences in absolute and proportional morbidity and
mortality with and without tobacco use. This neglect is
addressed by measures of the economic cost of tobacco
use, and by absolute and proportional morbidity and
mortality comparisons. By providing all these measures,
we shift to a multidimensional summary of tobacco
impact.
My intention in raising these issues is not to offer a solu-
tion to a specific summarization problem. Rather, it is to
remind those facing a choice among measures that candi-
dates need not (and, for policy purposes, should not) be
limited to unidimensional summaries. While our ability
to think in several dimensions is limited, it can be
improved with practice. That practice has proven crucial
in attacking problems in physics and engineering, and
there is no reason to suppose it is less important in tack-
ling more complex social policy issues. In instances in
which many different people must make informed
choices based on the same scientific data, but with differ-
ent values, multidimensional measures are essential if we
are to provide each person and each executive body with
sufficient information for rational choice.
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